GoingbeyondthedominantorthodoxnarrativetoincorporateinsightfromrevisionistscholarshipontheVietnamWar,MichaelG.KortpresentsthecasethattheUnitedStatesshouldhavebeenabletowinthewar,andatamuchlowercostthanitsufferedindefeat.Presentingastudythatisbothhistoriographicandanarrativehistory,KortanalyzesimportantfactorssuchasthestrongnationalistcredentialsandleadershipqualitiesofSouthVietnam’sNgoDinhDiem;theflawedmilitarystrategyof’graduatedresponse’developedbyRobertMcNamara;andtherealreasonsSouthVietnamcollapsedinthefaceofamassiveNorthVietnameseinvasionin1975.KortshowshowtheUScommitmenttodefendSouthVietnamwasnotastrategicerrorbutapolicyconsistentwithUSsecurityinterestsduringtheColdWar,andthattherewerepotentiallyviablestrategicapproachestothewarthatmighthavesavedSouthVietnam.
